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Abstract The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through
time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm
view and the stage view, and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and
adverbialism. Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by
photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some inter-
esting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist
worm view and the endurantist theories—are more like allies: they are much less
different than what is usually thought, and some alleged points of central disagree-
ment fall prey to closer scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to examine carefully all those
points, and to call attention to the places where the real differences between these
views lie. I will then turn to the perdurantist stage view, and claim that with respect to
some central issues it is the view that is the most different from the other three, but that
in some places the reason why it different is also the reason why it is less satisfactory.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Point 1
When looking at a photograph, one who is not familiar with photography may have
the naı¨ve impression that it depicts1 an instantaneous part of reality—a ‘frozen’
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1 I use ‘‘depict’’ roughly in the sense of what a photograph represents; and I use it neutrally with respect
to the debate concerning questions about whether photographs depict something in the same way
paintings do.
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moment of the world. But of course, this is not so, since taking a photograph takes
time, even if often a very short one, and a photograph thus depicts not an instant but an
interval of time. While the naı¨ve mistake is an easy one to make with respect to, for
instance, holiday landscape photographs that are usually taken at a high shutter speed,
the error becomes easily apparent on photographs that include moving subjects where
the exposure time is longer, such as on the photograph below (2.5 s shutter speed):
On photographs such as this one, the point appears obvious: it depicts a
temporally bigger portion of reality than just an instant of it. In this paper, I will use
the case of photographs to raise a discussion about some general points
(independent on photography) concerning eternalist theories of persistence through
time, and I will start by asking: ‘‘what kind of entities are depicted by
photographs?’’ Plausibly enough, they depict events, but they also depict objects
(a person, a building, a bench …), and it is the latter that I am interested in here.
Given that the objects depicted by photographs, which I will call the ‘depicta’, are
represented as something that persists (and changes!) through the whole interval of
time depicted by the photograph, a discussion of theories of persistence through
time is indeed here relevant, and as we shall see the case of the depicta of
photographs is an illuminating case that will shed some light on certain interesting
features of these theories.
Due to concerns about the length of this paper, I will limit myself here to the case
of eternalist theories of persistence (I discuss the case of presentist theories in my
manuscript). Eternalism is the doctrine about time which takes future and past
objects to exist in the same way present objects do—there is no ontological
difference between past, present and future; as Ted Sider puts it: ‘‘Just as distant
places are no less real for being spatially distant, distant times are no less real for
being temporally distant’’ (Sider 2001a, p. 11). In the eternalist’s manner of
speaking, future objects ‘‘exist’’, as well as present objects exist, in an atemporal
sense of the verb; it is as if one were viewing the universe from a God’s standpoint
and could contemplate all that happened, happens and will happen laid before his
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eyes (Arthur Prior calls this ‘‘the tapestry view of time’’ Prior 1996, p. 47). On this
view, ‘‘now’’ is an indexical term as well as ‘‘here’’ is.
1.2 Point 2
The endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in
various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the
stage view, and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism.
Using as a starting point the instructive case of the depicta of photographs, I will
examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results.
Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and
the endurantist theories—are more like allies: they are much less different than what
is usually thought, and some alleged points of central disagreement fall prey to
closer scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to examine carefully all those points, and to
call attention to the places where the real differences between these views lie. I will
then turn to the perdurantist stage view, and claim that with respect to some central
issues it is the view that is the most different from the other three, but that in some
places the reason why it different is also the reason why it is less satisfactory.
2 Part I: The Perdurantist Worm View and Endurantism: Enemies or Allies?
2.1 Point 3
Let us start with the worm view. One way to present it, and a way that will be useful
to my purpose here, is to see how it handles the phenomenon of intrinsic change
through time. Take the case portrayed on the photograph above of a man, Sam,
sitting on a bench and reading a book from t1 to t3 and then, at t4, standing up and
walking away. Sam, then, not only persists through the times from t1 to, say, t6 but
he also undergoes intrinsic change—he is first bent (since he is sitting) and then
straight (when he stands up), as illustrated on the figure below:
Sam
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
Worm view theorists claim that Sam is a ‘space-time worm’, that is, a temporally
extended entity that has temporal parts at every time at which it exists, and that his
having of different incompatible properties at different times is a matter of him having
different temporal parts at different times that have simpliciter the incompatible
properties.
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Now, suppose that the photograph of Sam above, taken at a low shutter speed,
depicts him during the interval from t2 to t5. What is then the depictum of the
photograph? Easily enough, the worm view theorist can say that the photograph
depicts a sub-worm of Sam, that is, a space-time worm that is just temporally
smaller than Sam—a non-instantaneous temporal part of Sam:
Sam
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
Sam's temporal part : the depictum 
On the photograph, Sam appears blurred, fuzzy, and partially transparent, this is
because, roughly, the first half of his temporal part depicted by the photograph, the
sitting one, only occupies a half of the interval and, thus, only a half of the total
exposure time, which makes it then appear half-transparent on the resulting
photograph; and similarly for his other temporal half.
None of the above yields any difficulties as far as the worm view is concerned.
According to the worm view, people are temporally extended worms that have
temporal parts, and qualitative intrinsic change over time is handled in terms of the
having of qualitatively different temporal parts at different times. An entity to play
the role of the depictum of a photograph such as the one of Sam is thus easily
provided by the worm view’s ontology: a space-time worm, as Sam is, just
temporally smaller. (I am not saying, of course, that the worm view is objection-
free; all I am saying is that given the worm view, there are no worries with respect to
the nature of the depicta of photographs.)
2.2 Point 4
The case of endurantism is more complex. Endurantism is often put as the view that
says that an object persists through time by being wholly (and not partly, as the
worm view has it) multiply located at all times at which it exists. Thus, at first, one
might be tempted to draw the following schema:
Sam
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
Sam Sam Sam Sam Sam 
With respect to the question about the depicta of photographs, there seems to be a
bizarre prima facie answer: a photograph of a person (even an ‘ordinary’ one, taken
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at a high shutter speed, where nothing is blurred) depicts one person a lot of times
(infinitely many times, if time is continuous). This sounds a bit strange, for the same
reason this whole picture of endurantism is strange: given eternalism, the idea here
is that time is space-like—but try to imagine the analogous spatial case of an object
‘multiply located’ at a lot of places in your garden at the same time. Clearly, since
objects are not universals, the natural thing to say here would rather be that there are
different objects laid before one’s eyes in the garden and not one single object
multiply located at all those different places. And since eternalism takes time to be
like space, if the picture above were the correct endurantist picture, the view would
be as strange as this spatial case.
But, fortunately, it is a bad picture. To see why, let us make a detour and consider
a traditional objection raised against endurantism, and see how endurantists reply to
it: the objection from temporary intrinsics. According to endurantism, Sam at t1 is
numerically identical to Sam at t5. At t1, he is bent, at t5, he is straight. But if we
follow the principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals, if Sam at t1 and Sam at t5 are
numerically identical then they should have all the same properties. But this leads to
the untenable claim that Sam, the very same object existing at t1 and t5, has the two
incompatible properties of being bent and being straight. This objection—that
endurantism fails to give an account of how persisting objects can have incompatible
properties at different times—was raised by David Lewis who once considered it to
be ‘‘the principal and decisive objection against endurance’’ (Lewis 1986, p. 203).2
To avoid the contradiction resulting from Sam’s having the incompatible
properties, the perdurantist worm view is revisionary about the object that exemplifies
those properties by analyzing it as an aggregate of temporal parts. There is no risk of
contradiction here because the incompatible properties are had by different things,
different temporal parts of Sam that are not claimed to be numerically identical.
A first way3 for endurantists to reach the same result is Peter Van Inwagen
(1985)’s way which is revisionary not about the object but about the properties. To
avoid contradiction, it is enough to say that properties are always time-indexed and
that consequently Sam does not exemplify two incompatible properties such as
‘‘being bent’’ and ‘‘being straight’’, rather he has the time-indexed properties
‘‘being-bent-at-t1’’ and ‘‘being-straight-at-t5’’ which are perfectly compatible.
Typically, perdurantists will object that, while it is true that there are time-indexed
properties, there still also are non-indexed properties like ‘‘being bent’’ and that the
contradiction has not been avoided, because even if Sam has at different times non-
contradictory time-indexed properties, it is also, and most importantly, possible for
him to have the non-indexed properties—and so trouble has not been avoided.
But this latter line of argument is quite strange, for it commits one to the claim that
Sam’s having of a property is his having of it simpliciter without any disguised
relations to times being involved. This is a strange strategy here because, while it is
true that endurantism cannot accommodate this claim, the perdurantist worm view
does not accommodate it either, since it also achieves Sam’s having his properties
only via a temporalizing device: Sam, the temporally extended object, is not bent, he
2 Compare Lewis (2002) for this and below.
3 The adverbialist strategy will be discussed in Sect. 2.6 below.
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can only be said to have this property at a time, by having a temporal part that has it. So
neither endurantism nor the worm view (tu quoque!) can defend the claim that Sam
has his temporary intrinsic properties simpliciter.4 (Perdurantists often say that Sam
has his properties in a ‘‘derivative’’ way.) So, the worm view temporalizes objects
(temporal parts), while endurantism temporalizes properties, and despite Lewis’s
objecting to the use of temporalized properties, and Van Inwagen’s objecting to the
use of temporalized objects (see for instance Van Inwagen 1985, p. 194), it just seems
here that both views use a theoretical temporalizing device that plays the same
theoretical role of making it possible for Sam to have properties; more precisely, the
device ‘‘to be a tn-part of’’ plays here the same role here as the device ‘‘-at-tn’’.
The moral of the considerations above is twofold. First, both endurantism and
perdurantism use a theoretical temporalizing device in order to avoid the threat of
contradiction from the having of temporary intrinsic properties, and so, not only
endurantists should be allowed to use their temporalizing device by their opponents,
but also we have just made a very first small step towards the claim that the
difference between endurantism and perdurantism is perhaps not as big as one
would initially think. Second, here is the correct endurantist picture:5
t2
Sam
bent-at-t1
bent-at-t2
bent-at-t3
straight-at-t4
straight-at-t5
straight-at-t6
If t2 is the present time, Sam is pictured as being bent, but he also has all of his
time-indexed properties—indeed, he has them all at all times at which he exists. The
latter point constitutes a further step towards the idea that endurantism and the
worm view are not that different. To see why, let us consider a traditional objection
to the worm view: the ‘no-change objection’.
We have seen above how the worm view provides a nice and elegant treatment of
how objects have different (incompatible) properties at different times—that is, how
objects can undergo change over time. But this nice and elegant solution is
sometimes criticized. Some will say, following, among others, Peter Simons that the
‘‘four-dimensional (i.e., worm view) alternative is not an explanation of change but
an elimination of it, since nothing survives the change which has the contrary
properties’’ (Simons 2000, p. 64). We want to give an account of how a single
object, Sam, can persist through change and the perdurantist is here telling us a story
about different objects (different parts) having different properties, and this is not
the story we wanted to be told. Once it is true that a certain temporal part of Sam is
4 Granted, and close to Lewis’ heart, only the perdurantist worm view allows for something (but not Sam)
to have temporary intrinsic properties simpliciter, namely, temporal parts of Sam. I will come back to this
at the end of Sect. 2.5.
5 See Van Inwagen (1985).
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bent, it will always be true—this is a fact that cannot, according to the worm view,
change. And this is what leads some to call this view a ‘static’ ontology: everything
seems to be just there and no object can ever genuinely change.
It is not my aim here and now to explore the worm view theorist’s reply to this
objection—it will be done in Sect. 3.1 below when I will discuss the stage view.
Rather, the very simple point that I want to make now is that the objection applies in
exactly the same way to endurantism. Even for the endurantist, the fact that Sam has
the property of being-bent-at-t1 is eternally (always) true and can never change. Since
all properties, according to endurantism, are time-indexed, any property that Sam has,
he has it always and forever, and so he has at t1 the very same properties that he has at t5,
and so, the ‘no-change objection’ goes, he does not undergo genuine change.
As in the case of the worm view, I do not think that this is something that should
bother the endurantist at all (for more details see Sect. 3.1 below). Change is the
having of different properties at different times, and both views manage to secure
this claim. But this is not my point here. The claim that I want to make is simply that
if the ‘no-change objection’ applies, it applies equally to both views; and if it does
not apply, it does not apply to either of the two views. Exactly as the case of
temporary intrinsics seen above was supposed to be an objection to endurantism and
a reason to favour the worm view, but is not, the case of the no-change objection
was supposed to be an objection to the worm view and a reason to favour
endurantism, but is not. Either both views are guilty of it or neither is. (More
precisely, the guilty guy, if anyone is guilty here, is eternalism.)
This completes the second step of my case for the claim that the perdurantist
worm view and endurantism, instead of being deadly enemies, are actually quite
close one to each other. Let us continue.
2.3 Point 5
Now that we have the correct endurantist picture in mind, we can ask how it handles the
case of the depicta of photographs. Remember that the photograph of Sam in Sect. 1.1
was taken at a low shutter speed and that it depicts him during the interval of time from
t2 to t5. So, something more needs here to be said in addition to the endurantist picture,
since this picture only represents Sam at one time (namely t2, in the example above).
Indeed, Van Inwagen insists that the features (relevantly, being bent) portrayed on the
schema should be those that Sam has at the present time, while his other properties are
only represented as being exemplified by Sam, but not as being drawn on the schematic
image. This may well work in the idealized case of an instantaneous present time, but it
will not do for the case of photographs, since they never depict an instantaneous part of
reality. When drawing such a schema for the photograph of Sam, we would easily
know what properties we should fill in the boxes (that is, all of his time-indexed
properties that he ever has), but we would not know how to draw the schematic image
of the person and how to draw the arrow of time, while avoiding to end up with the bad
endurantist picture we have seen at the beginning of Sect. 2.2. But don’t worry, this is
no trouble at all, one just needs to be more precise.
By ‘‘being more precise’’, I mean to stop drawing schemas in terms of little
fellows sitting or otherwise, but by being a bit more abstract and representing on the
Axiomathes (2009) 19:51–71 57
123
schema the fundamental components of the nature of Sam. Namely, there are two
main options: Sam is a bundle of properties, or Sam is a bare particular (substratum)
that instantiates properties.6 Let us start with the bundle theory:
Sam
bent-at-t1
bent-at-t2
bent-at-t3
straight-at-t4
straight-at-t5
straight-at-t6
bundling 
relation
…
According to this eternalist endurantist indexicalist bundle-theoretic view, Sam is
a bundle of properties (all of his time-indexed properties) united by a special
primitive relation often called ‘‘compresence’’ or ‘‘consubstantiation’’—I shall
simply call it ‘‘the bundling relation’’ in order to have a label as neutral as possible
and as non-informative as possible since this relation is a primitive one that is only
defined by its theoretical role: bundling together properties in order to make
particulars. Now that we have this more precise picture in mind, we can ask how it
provides an account of what is being depicted by the photograph of Sam. Here, the
answer is as easy and straightforward as it was in the case of the worm view (it just
took more time to get there in the endurantist’s case not because endurantism handles
this phenomenon less well, but because endurantism needed to be articulated more
carefully in order to have a view precise enough to be able to do any good job): it
depicts a part, a ‘sub-bundle’, of Sam who is the whole bundle. Since the photograph
depicts the interval of time between t2 and t5, it depicts the sub-bundle of Sam that
includes all of his properties that are indexed between t2 and t5.
There is nothing special coming from the bundle theory here, since the same
treatment can be given if one embraces the substratum theory as well:
Sam
bent-at-t1
bent-at-t2
bent-at-t3
straight-at-t4
straight-at-t5
straight-at-t6
substratum
…
6 Given the purposes, the scope, and the length of this paper, I unfortunately cannot examine all possible
variants of these two views, and I will limit myself to the general way they work, which will be enough
for what I want to claim. I will also ignore in this paper the ‘substance’ theory (for the same reasons as
those just given, and because I think it does not work at all, for reasons entirely independent on the debate
I am interested in here).
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According to the substratum (or ‘bare particulars’) theory, Sam is not only a
bundle of properties, rather his properties inhere in a substratum that exemplifies
them and unifies them in order to make a (thick) particular. But, with respect to my
present concerns, it does not matter whether it is a substratum that unifies the
properties in order to make a particular, or whether they are united by the bundling
relation.7 Both views get rid of the problem of not knowing how Sam should be
drawn (bent or straight?), since neither the substratum nor the bundling relation
have to be conceived that way, and both views get rid of the arrow representing the
flow of time, since all the information provided by it is already given by the indexes
attached to the properties. Both views are thus structurally entirely similar, and
allow for the same treatment of the nature of the depicta of photographs—in the
case of the bundle theory it is a sub-bundle, a part8 of the bundle that Sam is, and in
the case of the substratum theory it is a part of the whole of Sam as well: the
substratum plus all of the properties that are indexed between t2 and t5.
One way to see that this part of Sam is a genuine object in its own right is to
imagine a case where the remains of Sam do not exist—for instance, a case where a
person qualitatively exactly like Sam is created ex nihilo at t2 and destroyed at t5 in
such a way that it exists just for the interval of time where the photograph is taken.
The photograph would then depict this short-lived person that is not part of any
(temporally) bigger person—and so we see that the temporal part of Sam that
occupies the interval between t2 and t5 ‘does not need’ the remaining temporal parts
of Sam in order to count as an object.
The upshot of all these considerations is the following: first, endurantists can
handle the case of the depicta of photographs as easily as perdurantists, and second,
more importantly since the case of photography is no more than a particular
illuminating example, the general and more important truth is that the difference
between the perdurantist worm view and endurantism is getting smaller and smaller.
Indeed, contrarily to what is usually said by both opponents of endurantism and by
endurantists themselves, both views implement the notion of a temporal part of
objects such as Sam.
This is news, and it is good news for the endurantist, since now she can answer
some of the strongest objections that were raised against it, namely those that arise
from apparent cases of coincident entities such as the case of the Statue and the
Lump Sider’s (2001a) ‘‘Four-dimensionalism’’ is among the very influential places
where this objection is drawn). So, let me now show how endurantists can avoid this
sort of objections.
7 See my Benovsky (2008) for a detailed comparison between the bundle theory and the substratum
theory—a place where I argue in favour of an equivalence between (some variants of) these two views.
8 Laurie Paul in her defence of the bundle theory speaks about ‘‘logical parts’’ here, and defends a
genuine property mereology (Paul 2002). In Paul 2006 (especially Sects. 2.2 and 2.3) she develops in
detail the idea that ordinary objects are qualitative fusions that have properties as parts, and explores the
interesting consequences this has on the problem of coincidence; what I say about the Statue and Lump
case below is a simplified version (that is sufficient for my purposes in this paper) of the same basic idea
that she discusses brilliantly in more depth.
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2.4 Point 6
Let us say that at t1 there is a lump of clay that at t2 an artist forms into a statue.
Thus at t2 a statue is created. Let us say that it persists until some later time t3 and is
then destroyed (squashed). At some time after its destruction, at t4, the statue of
course does not exist anymore but the lump of clay still does. The lump of clay
persists from t1 to t4: it existed at t1 in a certain (let us say cubic) form, then it was
shaped into the form of a statue and, after the destruction, it was shaped again into
some other squashed form. A puzzle arises here because it seems that in the interval
of time from t2 to t3, the lump of clay and the statue are one and the same object:
they have the same form, the same location, they are made up of the same particles.
But, if they were the same object, they should, according to the principle of
Indiscernibility of Identicals, share all their properties. But this is not the case: the
lump of clay has, for instance, the historical property of being cubical at t1 that the
statue has not. So, after all, the statue and the lump of clay are different objects. But
then, it seems that we have a strange situation where we have two distinct objects
that coincide between t2 and t3. But how can that be? How can two different objects
be made of the same particles, have the same spatial location, etc? As Lewis asks, if
the lump weights 500 g, and the statue weights 500 g, and if both objects are there
between t2 and t3, why don’t we have in this interval of time something that weights
1,000 g? It seems that coincident objects are just unacceptable.
To provide an account of this case while avoiding the commitment to coincident
objects, the worm view theorist has a simple reply. The t2-part and the t3-part of the
statue are numerically identical, respectively, to the t2-part and the t3-part of the
lump of clay. For instance, the t2-part of the statue and the t2-part of the lump of clay
do share all of their properties—relevantly, they don’t have any different historical
properties such as being cubic at t1 because none of them existed at t1. But, of
course, this does not entail that the statue and the lump of clay (the worms) are
identical: the lump of clay, for instance, has parts at t1 while the statue does not. So
they are not identical but they share identical temporal parts—they temporally
overlap. Thus, if we accept temporal parts, the puzzle with the ‘coincident’ statue
and lump of clay is no more remarkable than the spatial case of two overlapping
roads, one of them being a sub-segment of the other (see, among others, Sider
2001a, p. 6, 152), as the following figure illustrates.
Statue
t1 t2 t3 t4
Lump
For the endurantist, however, the puzzle is traditionally taken to be genuine
trouble. Since it is the entire statue, and not a part of it, that is wholly present at t2 or
t3, since the same holds for the lump of clay, and since they are distinct objects
because they do not share all of their properties, the endurantist must endorse the
claim that, between t2 and t3, two numerically distinct objects coincide (see the
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figure below). Such a claim being unacceptable, this puzzle provides the objector
with a reductio against endurantism.
Lump
t1 t2 t3 t4
Lump and Statue 
(coincident but 
distinct entities)
Lump and Statue 
(coincident but 
distinct entities) Lump
But now, let us benefit from our lessons about bad pictures, and let us see what the
situation really is (I shall use below schemas using the bundle theory, but in the same
way as above, it would not make any difference relevant to my present concerns to
use the substratum theory). Let us have the following properties: CS = ‘‘being cube-
shaped’’, SS = ‘‘being statue-shaped’’, BS = ‘‘being blabla-shaped’’ (squashed),
W = ‘‘weighting 500 g’’. The perdurantist picture is then the following:
Statue
CS W
t1- part 
bundling 
relation
SS W
t2- part 
bundling 
relation
SS W
t3- part 
bundling 
relation
BS W
t4- part 
bundling 
relation
Lump
Nothing very exciting. The bundle Statue is simply a sub-bundle of the bundle
Lump. This is how, in terms of the bundle theory, we have the notion of overlap
used above by the perdurantist to answer the objection. The endurantist (good)
picture is more interesting:
This picture provides a nice surprise for the endurantist: she has readily at hand
here the very same nice treatment of the case that the perdurantist has. Exactly as in
the worm view view, the bundle Statue is a sub-bundle of the bundle Lump. So, as in
the case of the perdurantist worm view, we have the same notion of partial overlap.
This notion gives us, in both the perdurantist and the endurantist case, the means to
talk about two objects (if you want you can say two ‘‘coincident’’ objects, but they
are not coincident in any weird or unacceptable way, there are two objects in the non-
objectionable sense in which there are two objects where there is a common part of
Lump
CS-at-t1
bundling 
relation
W-at-t1 SS-at-t2 W-at-t2 SS-at-t3 W-at-t3 BS-at-t4 W-at-t4
Statue
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two Siamese twins), but also to talk about one object (the common part of the two
Siamese twins is one). So, both views can equally well and happily accept talk of two
objects and talk of one object in a non-objectionable way. The endurantist can simply
help herself with the same strategy the worm view has been using all along.
Generalizing, we can conclude that both views have the same explanatory power
with respect to the puzzle cases involving coincidence, and this completes another
important step towards the claim that the difference between endurantism and
perdurantism is much smaller than what is usually thought.
2.5 Point 7
What exactly is the conclusion of my overall argument? We have gone through four
steps:
1. Both views have to use a temporalizing device (‘‘to be a tn-part of’’ and ‘‘-at-
tn’’) in order to be able to say that Sam is bent or straight, and none of them can
say that Sam is bent or straight simpliciter.
2. Both view have to (and can) equally face the ‘no-change objection’.
3. Both views implement the notion of a temporal part (and can thus handle the
case of the depicta of photographs in the same way).
4. By using the notion of a temporal part both views can equally well provide a
satisfactory treatment of puzzle cases involving coincidence such as the Statue
and Lump case.
All of the four steps above were supposed to constitute the main differences
between the two views, and all four have even been considered as being decisive in
favour of one of the views over the other. (To provide only one reference for each
step: Lewis (1986, p. 203) at one point thought that (1) was decisive against
endurantism; Simons (2000, p. 64) thinks that (2) is decisive against perdurantism;
Van Inwagen (1981, p. 90) thinks that (3) is decisive against perdurantism since the
notion of a temporal part is unintelligible; Sider (2001a, Chap. 5) thinks that (5) is
decisive against endurantism.) So, if these four central points of alleged
disagreement between the two views collapse, doesn’t it in the end turn out that
there is no difference at all between the two views, and that they only are some sort
of terminological variants of each other? No, for two genuine differences remain.
First, as we have seen in (1) above, neither the worm view nor endurantism can say
that Sam is bent or straight simpliciter, but only the worm view can say that
something is bent or straight simpliciter, namely, one of his momentary temporal
parts (see for instance the last perdurantist schema in the previous section). Second,
once we have in mind the precise pictures (let them be bundle-theoretic or using the
substratum theory, it does not matter here), it is easy to see that the two views are
structurally different, for instance, if you take the case of the substratum theory, the
worm view will claim that there is one substratum per time that unifies the
properties had by Sam at that time, while the endurantist view will claim that there
is one substratum only that unifies all of the properties of Sam that he ever has (and
this makes for the endurantist claim that objects persist through time by being
numerically identical at different times, while the former makes for the perdurantist
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claim that nothing is ever numerically identical at different times and that objects
persist through time by having temporal parts). These two differences between the
two views are related: only because of their different structure can there be a
difference in the way the two views can or cannot claim that something has
properties such as being bent simpliciter. This is then where the differences between
these two traditional enemies lie, and not in one of the claims under (1–4).
2.6 Point 8
In Sect. 2.2 I postponed the discussion of the version of endurantism called
‘adverbialism’, and in the preceding sections I examined the endurantist view that
embraces indexicalism as a strategy to face the Lewisian worry from temporary
intrinsics. I shall now more quickly go through the adverbialist strategy, to see that
the same conclusions as above can de drawn for this version of endurantism as well.
Adverbialism is a version of endurantism that as a solution to the problem of
temporary intrinsics suggests not to temporally modify the property but the having
of it. Thus the adverbialist will say that ‘‘Sam is bent at t1’’ is to be analyzed as
‘‘Sam is-at-t1 bent’’ or, more elegantly, ‘‘Sam is t1-ly bent’’ (see Johnston 1987,
p. 129). So, according to adverbialism, there is not just the having of a property,
there is always t-ly having (or having-at-t) of a property. This will provide a solution
to the problem of temporary intrinsics, because Sam is bent at t1 and straight at t4,
and so he has both the incompatible properties, but it has the former t1-ly and the
latter t4-ly and this is how the threat of a contradiction is avoided.
There is one important difference between adverbialism and indexicalism: only
the latter, but not the former, is compatible with the bundle theory. So where we
always had the two options before, we have only one here. Indeed, in order to be
able to be an adverbialist, the substratum theorist has the option to say that there are
three components in her view—a substratum and its properties, of course, but also a
third theoretical device: a relation of exemplification between the substratum and its
properties, which, one can claim, is time-indexed (rather than the properties being
time-indexed, as the indexicalist would have it). The endurantist-adverbialist-
substratist picture then looks like this:
substratum
Sam
bent
t1-ly
t2-ly t3-ly
t4-ly t5-ly
t6-ly
bent bent straight straight straight
The bundle theorist, obviously, cannot (and does not want to) provide anything
like this, since she does not introduce a substratum that needs to be related by a
special relation to its properties; her view does not require any such intermediaries
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(and so, she cannot be an adverbialist since there is no suitable place where to put
the adverbialist index9). Note that this holds only for a certain version of the
substratum theory, namely a version that insists on there really being this third
component in the theory, a (time-indexed) relation between the substratum and its
properties. And even substratum theorists themselves often agree that this is a bad
version of their view (among other reasons, because of Bradley-like regresses and
related issues). Most recently, Ted Sider (2006) in his defence of substrata insists
that the relation of exemplification should not be put too much weight on, and
elsewhere it is often claimed as well that exemplification is not a relation, that it is a
‘‘non-relational tie’’ that we should not reify exemplification (Lewis 1983, pp. 351–
355). If the friend of substrata follows these recommendations, then she will hardly
be able to be an adverbialist, since there would be no good place to put the
adverbialist index on anymore. But if she is not impressed by the troubles that arise
when one takes the relation of exemplification seriously as a relation (that one can
put an index on), then she has the option of being an adverbialist, which gives rise to
the endurantist adverbialist substratist view.
Now we have this precise view in mind, let us see how it behaves with respect to
the four steps 1–4 from Sect 2.5 above:
1. As it was the case for endurantist indexicalism and for the perdurantist worm
view, adverbialism also has to use a temporalizing device (‘‘tn-ly’’) in order to
be able to say that Sam is bent or straight, and as the other views it cannot say
that Sam is bent or straight simpliciter.
2. Since adverbialism also is an eternalist view, and as the schema above shows, it
also has to (and can) equally face the ‘no-change objection’, for the same
reasons given in the case of indexicalism.
3. As the two other views, adverbialism also implements the notion of a temporal
part (and can thus handle the case of the depicta of photographs in the same
way).
4. As the two other views, by using the notion of a temporal part adverbialism can
equally well provide a satisfactory treatment of puzzle cases involving
coincidence such as the Statue and Lump case.
The last two points are easily seen by examining the endurantist adverbialist
substratist schema for the case of the Statue and Lump:
Lump
CS
substratum
Statue
W SS W SS W BS W
t1-ly
t1-ly
t2-ly t2-ly t3-ly t3-ly t4-ly
t4-ly
9 Indexing the bundling relation would make it straightforwardly a perdurantist view.
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Thus, once we have this precise and correct picture in mind, the endurantist
adverbialist eternalist substratist view turns out not to be different from the
perdurantist worm view and the endurantist indexicalist view with respect to the
four steps examined above.
As far as the differences are concerned, this version of endurantism is different
from the perdurantist worm view for the same two reasons mentioned at the end of
Sect. 2.5, and in addition to that there is the further difference between endurantism
and perdurantism here which is that only the latter is compatible with the bundle
theory.
3 Part II: The Stage View: A Common Enemy?
3.1 Point 9
Finally, I now turn to an eternalist theory of persistence through time that is
different from the other three views with respect to the four steps examined above:
the perdurantist stage view. I shall first go through the four steps, and then ask what
kind of difference we are dealing with here: metaphysical, or purely semantic/
linguistic?
The stage view’s account of persistence and change over time is the following (I
use the bundle theory, but like in the case of the worm view and of endurantist
indexicalism and unlike in the case of adverbialism, using the substratum theory
would make no relevant difference here):
According to this view, a person like Sam exists only at one time and is an
instantaneous entity (an instantaneous ‘stage’), and it persists through time by
having different temporal counterparts at other times. The ordinary object we refer
to as Sam is not a four-dimensional (temporally extended) entity, rather, there is a
series of stages interconnected by a counterpart relation, and ordinary objects are
conceived of as being the stages rather than the whole composed of them. Strictly
speaking, the different Sams are only momentary entities but they are nevertheless
said to persist through time by having counterparts at other times. However, the
stage view is still a four-dimensionalist view since it does not deny the existence of
temporally extended objects—the four-dimensional entities that are aggregates of
Sam-at-t1
…
bent …
bundling 
relation
straight …
bundling 
relation
…
bent …
bundling 
relation
straight …
bundling 
relation
Sam-at-t3 Sam-at-t4 Sam-at-t6
counterpart counterpart counterpart
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stages—they exist as well as the stages do. It’s just that, according to the stage view,
the objects we ordinarily name and quantify over are stages rather than worms. Let
us now see how the stage view behaves with respect to the four steps 1–4 above.
The first point of departure from the three other views is already easily seen when
it comes to the having of temporary intrinsic properties simpliciter. The stage view,
unlike the perdurantist worm view and the two endurantist views, can guarantee the
having of temporary intrinsic properties simpliciter by ordinary objects themselves.
This is easily achieved since, according to this view, ordinary objects like Sam (-at-
t1) are (instantaneous) stages, and those can have properties simpliciter without
making them to be relations to times. So such a view allows Sam to have simpliciter
the property of being bent (in a non-derivative way, contrarily to what the worm
view has to say).
What about the second step, the ‘no-change objection’? It seems that here also, the
stage view behaves differently than the three other views—the fact that it appeals to
different counterpart-related objects to provide an account of persistence makes it
weaker against the objection. Let us remember shortly how it goes: perdurantism
(worm view) does not account for genuine change of persisting material objects like
Sam, because it tells us a story about different objects (his different temporal parts)
existing at different times and having different properties, but none of those objects
can change. And similarly for endurantism (take the indexicalist version here): the
fact that Sam has the property of being-bent-at-t1 is eternally (always) true and can
never change; indeed, any property that Sam has, he has it always and forever, and so
he has at a time t1 the very same properties that he has at a later time t2, and so, the
‘no-change objection’ goes, he does not undergo genuine change.
As I already mentioned above, and as many have argued, I don’t think that either
of these views has really anything to fear here, since all have an equally adequate
reply to the objection. In short, here it is: the perdurantist can say that there is
something that changes, namely the four-dimensional Sam who is composed of all
of his temporal parts. Once one of his parts has any intrinsic property, it cannot
change, and it will always be true that it has (tenselessly) this property, but the four-
dimensional entity can be said to undergo a change by having different parts at
different times. Change is simply the having of different properties at different
times, and the perdurantist’s worm can easily accommodate this claim. And so can
(obviously) the endurantist.
But if one endorses the stage view, such a reply seems unavailable—for there is
no one thing that ever has the different properties. The worm view theorist claims
that the temporally extended Sam has them in a derivative way, and the endurantist
claims that he has different time-indexed properties, or that he has them tn-ly, but
the defender of the stage view does not have room for any of this in his theory: she
cannot show anything that could be said to undergo a change, even in a derivative
way. Of course, she can say that a certain stage, say at t1, is F and will be :F at t2 in
virtue of being a temporal counterpart of another stage existing at t2 that is :F. This
could maybe sound like a solution, but it is not: for these two stages are just two
completely different things. As Mellor (1998, p. 89) puts it, ‘‘change needs identity
as well as difference’’. But there is only difference in the stage view, there are only
different things with different properties.
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This is not the end of the story, of course. For what is involved here, and what the
stage view theorist’s reply will criticize, is a version of the ‘Humphrey objection’
applied to temporal counterpart theory. The objection runs as follows: if Sam says
now that he will visit his friend Worf tomorrow, then the sentence turns out to be true
iff he’ll visit Worf tomorrow. But this is, according to the stage view, simply
impossible, because the person who says now that he’ll visit Worf tomorrow is a
stage, a momentary entity that will not itself persist until tomorrow and thus, will not
be able to visit anyone. Sam, the person who is doing the speaking, is simply not
identical, in any sense, to the person who’s supposed to do the visiting. Granted, Sam
has a counterpart tomorrow that’ll visit (or not) Worf. But whatever the counterpart
relation is, it is not identity. So, the objection goes, if Sam says he’ll visit Worf
tomorrow, why would Worf care about someone else, similar to Sam and linked to
him by a counterpart relation, to visit him? Note that the ‘‘someone else’’ claim is
very strong here: if one endorses the stage view, there is no sense in which Sam from
today is identical to Sam tomorrow. If one generalizes this objection, one can simply
claim that it denies persistence altogether. For the stage view ontology provides us
only with instantaneous entities, and aggregates of those, but it rejects ‘worms’ in the
sense that it rejects the view that ordinary objects like people are four-dimensional
entities. The stage view’s persistence, the objector says, is not genuine persistence.
Sider defends the stage view against this objection as follows: ‘‘[It] is wrong to
say that the stage view denies that ‘You will do it’ means that you will do it. ‘Ted
was once a boy’ attributes a certain temporal property, the property of once being a
boy, to me, not to anyone else. Of course, the stage view does analyse my having
this property as involving the boyhood of another object, but I am the one with the
temporal property, which is the important thing. The stage view is consistent with
stages having temporal properties; it’s just that temporal properties are given a
counterpart theoretic analysis’’ (Sider 2001a, p. 195).
But this reply is not likely to give satisfaction to the objector. Granted, the stage
view is consistent with stages having temporal properties, but not the ones we want.
To take Sider’s example, if we say ‘‘Ted was once a boy’’, we are ascribing a certain
temporal property to Ted (who exists now). But if we want to endorse the stage
view, it is not the property of ‘‘once being a boy’’, but rather, the property of ‘‘once
there being a counterpart of Ted that is a boy’’. If the stage view theorist allows
these two properties to be equivalent then she is mistaken—for if it is the former
that we ascribe to Ted, it is solely about Ted that we are speaking, but if we ascribe
him the latter, we are speaking about Ted and someone else, and that makes all the
difference. Sider’s response can only appear to be satisfactory if one takes the
expression ‘‘once being a boy’’ to be a suitable paraphrase of the expression ‘‘once
there being a counterpart of x that is a boy’’, but such a strategy, objectors like Sally
Haslanger will claim ‘‘strains the limits of credibility’’ (Haslanger 2003, p. 337).
Although I have sympathies with the objector, my point here is not to claim that
we should reject the stage view because of this objection. Rather I only wish to
claim that the stage view has more to do than the worm view or any of the versions
of endurantism in order to answer the no-change objection step (2), and that its reply
has to be different, since it cannot appeal to any one object having different
properties at different times, in the way the two other views do it.
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With respect to step (1), the stage view has an advantage over the other
competing views, and with respect to step (2), it seems on the contrary to be in a
weaker position. This should not be very surprising, since the stage view is also
structurally different from its competitors (this is step (3)). As we have seen,
according to the stage view, a person like Sam is ‘no more’ than this:
Sam(-at-t1)
bent …
bundling 
relation
Which is quite different from the worm view and both versions of endurantism.
To put it simply, the three other views claim that Sam is ‘bigger’—he is a bundle10
not only of properties he has at one time, but of all of his properties he ever has. And
this salient difference in structure will also make the stage view to behave very
differently with respect to step (4): the case of the Statue and the Lump. While the
crucial notion that is appealed to by the worm view and endurantism to have a
treatment of the puzzle is the notion of overlap, nothing similar is either available or
needed if one embraces the stage view, since there is nothing temporally extended
that could be said to overlap. At a time t2 for instance, there is only one
instantaneous entity that is a statue made out of a lump of clay but there are not two
coincident objects at this time, since the reason for thinking that there could be two
different objects was that they were suspected to have distinct historical properties
like ‘‘being cube-shaped in the past’’ or ‘‘having existed at t1’’, but no instantaneous
entity has any such properties. It can be said to have them by having different
temporal counterparts at different times, but the counterpart relation being flexible
(context dependent) it will be able to have different counterparts qua Statue and
different counterparts qua Lump—so what we have is just one object that has
different counterparts under different counterpart relations and there is no threat of
ending up with coincident entities.
To sum up: the stage view is different from the three other views with respect to
all four steps of my argument. It behaves better in the case of the having of
temporary intrinsic properties, it is weaker with respect to the no-change objection,
it is structurally different, and it provides a different treatment of the Statue and
Lump case.
The diagnostic of why exactly this view is different from the others is readily at
hand: because it takes objects like Sam to exist at only one single time, while all the
competing views take them to exist at more than one time. To put it in a more
objection-like way: because instead of providing an account of persistence through
time, it actually denies genuine persistence.
10 In the case of endurantist adverbialism, the substratum theory would be needed, which would not
make any relevant difference to my present concerns.
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One way to support this objection is to insist on the importance of the fact that the
stage view is weaker with respect to the no-change objection, as we have seen
above, and to insist that the ‘Humphrey objection’ to temporal counterpart theory
succeeds. But there is also another (but related) way to see this defect of the stage
view: that the view does not allow ordinary objects to do the things they typically
can do. People, like Sam, are stages. But stages are instantaneous entities, they do
not have temporal extent. The unwelcome consequence of this is that people cannot
do many of the things we would expect them to be able to do. For instance, it seems
that a person should normally be able to utter a sentence. But, on the stage view, this
turns out to be impossible, strictly speaking: the utterance of a sentence takes some
time and a stage does not last long enough to make such a performance. Or,
normally, Sam can run, but again, not according to the stage view; strictly speaking
nobody can run because a person is an instantaneous entity and running takes time.
The obvious reply of the stage view theorist to this is that Sam can utter a
sentence and run because he has counterparts at ‘neighbour’ times and if we take
several counterparts together, they can achieve such a performance. It takes more
than one single stage to speak or to run.
But then, what do we really mean when we say that a person runs? What do we
refer to by ‘‘this person’’? We have seen that it seems that if we refer to the
instantaneous stage (as we should, if we follow Sider’s recommendations: space-
time worms ‘‘are not ordinarily named or quantified over’’ Sider 2001a, p. 191) it is
impossible for our sentence to be true (an instantaneous entity does not have enough
time to run).
Then maybe we refer to a sum of successive person-counterparts, which is a thing
that lasts long enough to do the performance. But what is this sum? I see two
possibilities: first, that it is a set of numerically distinct entities (the distinct temporal
counterparts), or second, that it is a whole composed of the different counterparts.
The first possibility seems really unpalatable: the view according to which a set of
distinct objects can run would be hard to defend. We are then left with the second
possibility; but this just amounts to embracing the worm view, for the thing that has
the properties we are interested in (running, speaking, and so on) is a temporally
extended four-dimensional entity—and so, those properties are really had by a
‘worm’ rather than by a stage. So, since this way out (a way that nobody takes, as far
as I know) is closed, the stage theorist will have no choice but stick to his original
claim: ‘‘this person’’ refers to an instantaneous stage, and it has the property of
running in virtue of having temporal counterparts at neighbour times—and this is
how a person can run. Very well but what this claim commits the stage view theorist
to, is to endorse the further claim that since the person has the property of running in
virtue of its relations to other persons (his past and future counterparts), this property
turns out to be extrinsic, contrary to what we’d usually say. And for the same reasons,
a lot of properties that we usually take to be intrinsic, turn out to be extrinsic,
according to the stage view. So if one wants to account for the fact that people can
speak and run, and that the properties involved here are intrinsic, one should embrace
the worm view or endurantism rather than the stage view.
Again, this is not the end of the story. For the stage view theorist will defend his
view here by simply biting the bullet and accepting that most properties we thought
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to be intrinsic are in fact extrinsic.11 But, again, my point is not here to establish
whether we should accept the stage view or not, although I have been offering
reasons that point towards rejecting it. The point I wish to make by raising the
objections above is to show in what respects the stage view is different from its
competitors, and I think that this has been established.
Still, one might wonder what kind of difference this really is. Is it a metaphysical
difference? It certainly is not a difference in what there is since all the views are
eternalist and postulate the existence of the same distribution of matter across space-
time, and the stage view does not deny the existence of mereological sums of stages
that correspond to the worm view’s space-time worms.12 So the difference is not
one in what there is (contrary to what is the case in the presentism-eternalism
controversy), but in the analysis of what ordinary objects like tables or people are. Is
this a metaphysical or a semantic difference? In a sense, as Sider himself claims, it
seems to be an only semantic/linguistic one, since the disagreement only seems to
be about ordinary language terms and reference—a disagreement located in what we
usually name and quantify over when we make claims about ordinary objects.
But, as Parsons (2004, p. 3) points out, rightly I think, metaphysical questions are
not only questions about what there is, but also about how things are. To take his
example: ‘‘Does time pass?’’ is as much a metaphysical question as ‘‘Does the future
exist?’’ It is true, Parsons says, that the worm view and the stage view agree on the
stuff there is, but it doesn’t follow that they agree on all metaphysical questions—
like the question of what the nature of tables and people is, that is, how they are. The
question whether, for example, I am three or four-dimensional is a metaphysical
one. Or, the two views do not provide the same answer to the question: ‘‘how many
people are there on the photograph of Sam?’’—indeed, there are much more people
on this photograph according to the stage view (as many as there are instants, or
infinitely many if time is continuous) than according to what the other views say. So
it seems that the disagreement between the stage view and the other competing
views I have discussed is not merely semantic/linguistic but genuinely metaphys-
ical, and that it is about whether ordinary objects are best conceived of as time-
bound (momentary) or extended in time.
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